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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its ROAD 
COMMISSION, 
PT,aintiff, 
vs. 
-Civiil 
POLLY THOMPSON, also known as POLLY 
THOMPSON BRITTAIN, UTAH POWER & 
LIGHT COMP ANY; MORGAN GUARANTY 
TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK; A. P. 
NEILSON and LILLIE M. NEILSON, his 
wife; GERHARDT DRECHSEL and ERNA 
A. DRECHSEL, his wife; BEN H. DA VIS 
and DOROTHY M. DAVIS, his wife; DON-
ALD W. LAYTON and HELEN D. LAYTON, 
his wife; MARY IZETTA OGDEN McHALE; No. 10308 
and PHYLLIS LUCILLE MOORE, 
Defendants. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY and 
MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY 
OF NEW YORK, 
Appell,ants, 
VS. 
A. P. NEILSON and LILLIE M. NEILSON, 
his wife, 
Re~pondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This action was originallY commenced by the State 
of Utah acting by and through its Road Commission to 
condemn the fee title of certain lands for Interstate 
1 Highway purposes. The Appellants and the Respond-
ents both claim to be the owners of such lands and this 
proceeding will determine such ownership. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT 
Following a pretrial hearing before the District 
Court on November 17, 19G4, and a Stipulation there 
entered into between the present Appellants and the 
Respondents, the District Court on the 29th day of Di'-
cember, 1964, entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment in favor of the Respondents, A. P, 
Neilson and Lillie l\f. Neilson, his wife. From these Find-
ings, Conclusions and Judgment, the Appellants, Utab 
Power & Light Company and Morgan Guaranty Trust 
Company, appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellants seek a reversal of judgment of the 
District Court and a judgment in their favor as a matter 
of law to the effect that they are the owners of the 
property involved herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was commenced by the State of Utah 
acting by and through its State Road Commission by the 
filing of a complaint and by the service of smmnons on 
or about April 4, 1963. (Tr. 1) The action sought to 
condemn the fee title to approximately 20 separate tract8 
of land for Interstate Highway 80 and particularly the 
west approach of said highway from the Salt Lake City 
Airport to Interstate Highway 15. (Tr. 17) Both the 
Appellants and the Respondents were the owners of 
several tracts and the controversy between themselve~ 
and the Road Commission has been resolved with the 
L'\reption of the one tract involved in this proceeding. 
This tract is designated in the complaint as Parcel No. 
02-3 :-±7D :'11 and is legally described as all of Lots 19 and 
20, Block 9, Irving Park Addition, Salt Lake City Survey. 
As to this tract of land, both the Appellants and thr. 
Respondents agreed that the appraised value as made 
and offered by the Road Commission was fair and such 
amount is reflected in the judgment. (Tr. 26 and 29) 
However, these parties have not agreed upon the owner 
ship of the tract of land condemned. 
rrhe stipulation entered into between these parties 
on November 17, 1964, (Tr. 34) and the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the District 
Court on December 29, 1964, (Tr. 39 and 43) show the 
evidentiary facts to be the following. Since the issuance 
of the patent to these lands, taxes for three different 
~'ears remained unpaid and for each of these years an 
Auditor's Tax Deed subsequently issued to Salt Lake 
County. Each of these tax deeds was issued without the 
attachment of the required affidavit of the County Audi-
tor to the tax rolls. On March 12, 1958, Salt Lake County 
deeded the property to the Respondents who thereafter 
paid to the Salt Lake County Treasurer the general 
taxes levied against said property. 
1.'he Respondents have never had actual possession 
of the property and have done nothing with respect to 
said property that could be said in any way to evidence 
any claim of ownership thereto by way of fences, culti-
ration or improvements of any kind. (Tr. 39) 
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The Appellants contend that they are the owners of 
the property and base this contention of ownership upon 
conveyances from the admitted owner Jacob I All 
' · en-
bach, through his wido-\v, Harriet Allenbach. The record 
is wholly silent as to whether Jacob I. Allenbach di Pd 
otherwise than intestate or left any heirs other than his 
wife, Harriet. (Tr. 39) 
The Appellants became the owners of the property 
on January 10, 1955 and commencing with the year 195G 
and for each year to and including 1963 Appellants paid 
to Salt Lake County the taxes on said Lots 19 and 20, 
Block 9, Irving Park Addition, Salt Lake City Survey, 
pursuant to assessment made therefor by the Utah State 
Tax Commission. (Tr. 39) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I and POINT II 
POINT I. THAT THE EVIDENCE AND THE FIND-
INGS DO NOT SUPPORT A CONCLUSION THAT THE 
RESPONDENTS HA VE ESTABLISHED ANY TITLE TO OR 
OWNERSHIP IN SAID REAL PROPERTY. 
POINT II. THAT UNTIL THE RESPONDENTS HAVE 
ESTABLISHED SUCH TITLE AND OWNERSHIP, IT IS 
ERROR TO CONCLUDE THAT THE APPELLANTS ARE 
BARRED UNDER SECTION 78-12-5.2, UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED, 1953, OR UNDER ANY OTHER SECTION, FROM 
ASSERTING THEIR OWNERSHIP. 
For the purposes of argument, Appellants have 
combined Points I and II in order to avoid being repeti-
tious and in order to clearly present the problem at issue. 
We believe the problem can be simply stated to be "Can 
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the hold(·r of a tax title claim an absolute ownership to 
thr real property ba~wd solely upon holding that tax title 
for four years after purchase from the County?" We 
earnestly contend that he cannot and that he must estab-
lish the other elements of adverse possession and par-
ticularly that of actual possession. 
As this Court well knows, the various statutes deal-
ing with limitations of actions and with adverse posses-
sion have been the subject of a number of legislative 
t•nactnwnts and of a considerable number of decisions 
h~· the Court in recent years. The problem now. presented 
has not been considered in its entirety in any prior deci-
~ion. '\Ve have reviewed all of the cases bearing on the 
rnhjPct since the adoption of the 1951 amendments and 
have carefully considered those amendments. These 
amendments, together with the other pertinent sections 
of the Code, are now numbered as Sections 5, 5.1, 5.2, 
:i.3, 6, 7, 7.1, 8, 9, 12, and 12.1 of Chapter 12 of Title 78 
of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
It is our contention that these sections must be read 
together, that they define the elements of adverse pos-
~ession and that the holding of a tax title for four years 
after purchase from the County is only one of those ele-
ments. 
It does not appear to us to be possible that a legis-
lative enactment could constitutionally force a property 
nwner to actually occupy, fence or cultivate property to 
which he has legal title should such owner be disinclined 
to do so; nor may such legislation deprive an owner of 
title to his property solely by reason of such disinclina-
tion. Statutes of limitation and of adverse possession 
require affirmative action on the part of the disseisoi , 
and not on the part of the true owner, in such manner 
and form that such owner is put on notice of the adverse 
claim. 
The matter is well discussed and excellently pre-
sented in the following excerpts from 3 Am J ur 2d 
commencing on page 86 of the treatise on Adverse Pos-
sess10n: 
"The basic requisite of adverse possession 
is that a cause of action accrue against a disseisor 
in order that the statute of limitations may be· 
gin to run. As developed in succeeding sections, 
it is generally held that in order to bar the true 
owner of land from recovering it from an occu-
pant in adverse possession and claiming owner-
ship through the operation of the statute of 
limitations, the possession must have been for the 
whole period prescribed by the statute, actual, 
open, visible, notorious, continuous, and hostile 
to the true owner's title and to the world at large; 
it is also essential that the possession have been 
held under a claim of right or title. Under par-
ticuar statutes color of title may also be neces-
sary. When these elements coincide and the 
possession continues for the statutory period, a 
title by adverse possession is acquired." 3 Am 
Jur 2d 86 
"One claiming title by adverse possession 
always claims in derogation of the rigl~t o~ tl:e 
real owner· he admits that the legal title is in 
another. He rests his claim, not upon a title in 
himself, as the true owner, but upon holding ad-
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versely to the true owner for the period pre-
scribed by the statute of limitations. Generally, 
adverse possession may exist independently of 
title. Thus, as a general rule, one who seeks to 
set up an adverse possession need not have a 
good title, or in fact any title, except a possession 
adverse and hostile to that of the true owner 
under a pretense or claim of title. Adverse pos-
session may exist with color of title, however; 
under some statutes color of title is essential to 
the acquisition of title by adverse possession, and 
under others the requirements for obtaining such 
a title are less stringent with color of title than 
without it." 3 Am Jur 2d 87 
"The whole doctrine of title by adverse pos-
session rests upon the acquiescence of the owner 
in the hostile acts and claims of the person in 
possession. The theory upon which title may be 
acquired by adverse possession is that it is to be 
implied from the acquiescence of the owner in 
the hostile claim for the statutory period. The 
ultimate element in the rise of a title through 
adverse possession is the acquiescence of the real 
owner in the exercise of an obvious, adverse, or 
hostile ownership through the statutory period. 
The true owner of land who fails to protect his 
right against one holding in adverse possession 
thereof and manifesting the same as required by 
statute and for the length of time fixed thereby, 
is considered as having acquiesced in the transfer 
of ownership." 3 Am Jur 2d 87 
And with respect to the question of possession, the 
authors at 3 Am J ur 2d 89 make the following assertions: 
"Possession is one of the indispensable ele-
ments in adverse possession. Actual possession 
or occupancy is always involved in any claim to 
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land by adverse possession. There must be aH 
actual possessio.n of th~ lands to create a title by 
adverse pos~es~10n. It is therefore a general rul·e 
that one clamnng land adversely must, in orde, 
that his claim may be effective as against th
1 
owner, be in actual possession thereof, for, with~ 
out such occupancy, the law assumes the possrs-
sion to be in the owner of the legal title. In th2 
absence of color of title, the rule requires actual 
possession of all the land claimed. The statutory 
requirements are not satisfied by the assertio~ 
of the right of possession. Possession will not be 
presumed from the execution of a deed. Nor will 
the rights of the lawful owner be affected hv his 
mere neglect to assert them, unless the prope~ty i~ 
actually occupied by an adverse claimant." 
Since the 1951 amendments to the adverse possession 
statute, this Court has been called upon to decide a num-
ber of cases brought for the purpose of quieting title to 
real estate. Some of these cases were commenced beforr 
the effective date of the 1951 amendments and some are 
concerned with the amendments, but each case hert>in-
after cited involves in some manner the question of ad-
verse possession following the acquisition of a tax title 
deed from the County. 
In Pender v. Jackson, 260 P. 2d 542, 123 Utah 501, 
decided on July 28, 1953, the 1Court found against the 
tax title holder even though taxes had been paid by such 
holder from 1940 through 1949. In quoting from Madsen 
v. Cohn, 122 Cal App 704, 10 P. 2d 531, the Court said: 
"Hence, an open and notorious o~cupation 
with hostile intent is a necessary constituent of 
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an adverse possession. Neither a hostile intent 
without such occupation, nor such occupation 
without hostile intent, is sufficient." 
In Farrer v. Johnson, 271 P. 2d 462, 2 Utah 2d 189, 
derided on J un2 10, 1954, the Court found against the 
holder of a tax title who, though out of possession, had 
paid all of the taxes on the lands in question. 
The case of Hansen v. Morris, 283 P. 2d 884, 3 Utah 
~d 310, decided on .May 12, 1955, was the first case involv-
ing the 1951 amendments. Although the iCourt upheld 
the statute, the factual matters upon which the_ adverse 
possession was based do not appear in the Court's deci-
~ion and it is not possible to determine factually the 
question of possession. 
The second case under the 1951 amendments was 
decitlPd on July 16, 1957 and is cited as Peterson v. 
Callister, 313 P. 2d 814, 6 Utah 2d 359, affirmed on re-
hearing on February 3, 1959, in 334 P. 2d 759, 8 Utah 
2(1 3-1:8. In this case the County recorded an unacknow-
ledged auditor's tax deed in 1932 and issued an unac-
knowledged deed to the plaintiffs in 1944. However, 
both deeds were recorded; the plaintiffs were in actual 
possession and farmed the property continuously from 
19±4: to the commencement of the action in 1955; and the 
plaintiff paid all of the taxes during these years. A find-
ing for the plaintiff was upheld. 
In Michael v. Salt Lake Investment Company, 345 
P. 2d 200, 9 Utah 2d 370, decided on October 19, 1959, 
the Court found that the defendant had only a 1909 deed 
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from the County with no possession or payment of ta_ 
XPS. 
The Court found for the plaintiff and made the follow-
ing observation: 
"With ?ef endant's assertion that plaintiffs 
must prevail on the strength of their own titlP 
we have no quarrel, believing, however, that their 
burden in this respect successfully has been 
shouldered." 
In Pender v. Alix, 354 P. 2d 1066, 11 Utah 2d 58 
' decided on August 24, 1960, the Court upheld a summary 
judgment in a quiet title action. A reading of the decision 
would indicate that the Court was satisfi2d with the 
proof of possession offered by the successful intervenor. 
We have called the Court's attention to the preceed-
ing six cases in order to show that th2 actual occupancy 
of the property by the successful litigant conclusively 
appears in each, either from the fact recital or from the 
Court's assumption in each case. 
We would now urge that the case of Lyman v. Na-
tional Mortgage Bond Corp., 320 P. 2d 322, 7 Utah 2d 
123, decided on January 14, 1958, should be conclusive 
of the matter in controversy here. In that case the 
plaintiffs had secured a tax deed from the County in 
1941 and had since been in actual possession, had culti-
vatBd the property and improved and fenced it. How-
ever, they failed to show payment of taxes for four 
consecutive years even though the evidence was clear 
that those taxes not paid were subsequently redeemed. 
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The Court found, however, that the plaintiffs did not 
bring themselves within the statute as to adverse posses-
sion and we urge the following ruling from that case to 
be eon trolling upon the case at bar: 
"In Bowen v. Olson, decided in 1953 under 
Section 78-12-12, U.iC.A. 1953, prior to the 1951 
amendment, we held that a redemption from a 
delinquent tax assessed against this property 
claimed by adverse possesion under a tax sale did 
not constitute a payment of taxes levied and 
assessed upon such property within the meaning 
of that statute. After a careful consideration we 
adopted the majority rule on that question and 
we are not now inclined to overrule that decision 
but adhere thereto. The facts in that case are not 
distinguishable from the facts in this case. 
"Plaintiffs contend that a different result is 
required by the 1951 amendments to Section 104-
2-5, U.C.A. 1943, which is the same as 78-12-5.1, 
Pocket Supplement to Volume 9 ,U.C.A. 1953, and 
Section 104-2-5.10, Laws of Utah for 1951, which 
is the same as Section 78-12-5.2, Pocket Supple-
ment to Volume 9, U.C.A. 1953. In plaintiff's 
brief these sections are ref erred to as statutes of 
limitation as distinguished from the other sec-
tions previously cited above, which are referred 
to as adverse possession statutes. Hereinafter 
these designations will be used to distinguish the 
two sets of statutes. 
"These sections forbid the commencement or 
maintenance of an action or defense claiming 
ownership or right of possession to real property, 
unless the claimant was seized, possessed or occu-
pied such property within seven years prior to 
11 
the commencement of such action. -Where th 
adverse party, in such action, claims under a t : 
title the limitations period is shortened to requt.x 
• . • 1 e 
seizure, possess10n o.r occupation within four 
years after the creat10n of the tax title clailll 
rrhese statutes are different from the advers~ 
possession statutes considered above in that thev 
contain no requirement that the adverse party t~ 
the claimant in such action must have had adverse 
possession and paid all taxes assessed against 
such property during the limitations period. In 
fact, the limitation statutes make no mention of 
any rights which the adverse party must have in 
order to invoke the provisions of these limitation 
statutes. 
"A very strict construction of these statutes 
might require a holding in plaintiff's favor even 
though they have failed to show payment of the 
taxes for the period required by the adverse pos-
session statutes, for it is clear that none of the 
defendants have actually occupied or been in 
possession of the property within the prescribed 
limitations period. However, plaintiffs can pre-
vail only if we hold that defendants' claims are 
barred under these limitations statutes by their 
failure to occupy or be in possession of the 
property within the prescribed period, regardless 
of whether plaintiffs have proved a valid claim 
to this property. Such a holding would leave the 
plaintiffs in possession although they have failed 
to establish anv valid claim to such property 
under the adve;se possession statutes previously 
discussed on which their claims are based or by 
any other means. 
"We do not think that such construction of 
these statutes was intended. Plaintiffs must suc-
ceed on the strength of their own claim and not 
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alone on the weakness of the defendants' claims 
in order to succeed. The mere failure of the 
defendants to show that they have actually occu-
pied or been in possession of this property is not 
sufficient to bar their rights to recover the 
property where, as here, plaintiffs have failed to 
establish any valid claim or right to the property 
in themselves. These limitation statutes, although 
they do not expressly so provide, only bar the 
right of a party to maintain an action to recover 
real property where the opposing party estab-
lished a right of possession or mvnership in the 
property. This plaintiffs have failed to do, so the 
decision must be reversed." 
POINT III. 
POINT III. THAT THE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT 
PAID THE TAXES ON SAID REAL PROPERTY WITHIN 
THE DEFINITION OF PAYMENT ADOPTED BY THIS 
COURT IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTES 
AS TO SUCH PAYMENT AND THE RESPONDENTS HA VE 
NOT BY REASON THEREOF ESTABLISHED ANY TITLE 
TO OR OWNERSHIP IN SAID REAL PROPERTY. 
'1111e Findings of Fact in this case (Tr. 41) state 
that: 
"Utah Power & Light Company has paid 
taxes to the State Tax Commission within the 
requirements of the Public Utilities Act covering 
real and personal property owned by said Com-
pany in the State of Utah. Said taxes have been 
paid each year since the conveyance from Valley 
Investment Company to Utah Power & Light 
Company. The defendants, A. P. Neilson and 
Lillie M. Neilson, have paid to Salt Lake County 
when duP the general property taxes assessed by 
said County each year since the conveyance from 
13 
Salt Lake County. This action was comrrie ~ . nceu 
Apnl 4, 1963, and the State secured an Order of 
Occupancy on the 22nd day of April, 1963." 
In order that this apparent discrepancy may beconw 
understandable, it is necessary to ref er to the statutes 
under which the property of a public utility is assessed 
and taxed. 
Section 59-5-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides 
that" ... All property of public utilities whether operated 
within one county or more ... must be assessed by the 
State Tax Commission ... " 
Section 59-5-52, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, speci-
fies the time of assessment and Section 59-5-55, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, provides for the record of such 
assessment. Following compliances with these sections, 
the State Tax Commission must apportion public utility 
property in proportion to each county and Section 59-
6-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides for such report 
from the State Tax Commission to each county auditor. 
Thereafter the public utility receives its tax statement 
from the county and pays the same to the county trea-
surer. 
Thus, under the Findings in this case the Appellants 
have paid the general taxes on this property for each of 
the years from 1956 to 1963, both inclusive; and from 
these same Findings it can be determined that the Re-
spondents have paid these taxes only for the yearn 
1959, 1960, 1961, and 1962. 
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\Ye urge that the case of Christensen v. Mitnstcr, 
~(ii\ I'. :.?d 75G, 1 Utah 2d 335, decided on February 11, 
HJ3J, is controlling here. In that case although the 
rHeHdants ·were in actual possession under their tax 
deed from the county and had paid taxes for five of the 
~ev'n years nPcessary to perfect their title, the payment 
of (axes for two years hy the record owner effectively 
baned tlw continued assertion of an adverse title. This 
Court in holding for the plaintiffs said: 
"\Ve prefer to adopt the view espoused by the 
authorities cited by plaintiff, and we conclude, 
therefore and hold that payment by the record 
owner or his agent of the taxes for one or more 
!'ears during the 7-year period, prior to any pay-
ment thereof having been made by the adverse 
possessor, not only extinguishes his tax liability, 
hut extinguishes the tax itself and effectively 
inkrrupts the continuity of events necessary to 
perfect title by adverse possession." 
'rhe principles here adopted were upheld and re-
affirmed in the succeeding cases of Bowen v. Olson, 268 
P. ~d 983, 2 Utah 2d 12, and Lyman v. National Mortgage 
Dolld Corp., supra. 
15 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the evidence and the 
findings made therefrom in this matter wholly fail lo 
support any title or ownership in the Respondents as 
to the real property involved in this proceeding an<l 
that the Appellants as a matter of law are entitled to a 
decree to the effect that the legal and beneficial title to 
said property remains in them. 
Respectfully submitted, 
F. GERALD IRVINE and 
ROBERT B. PORTER 
1407 West North Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants, 
Utah Power & Light Company 
and Morgan Guaranty Trust 
Company of New York 
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